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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-16.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
Primary Issues:
1.

Can the Use Tax apply to a transaction occurring entirely within

the State of Utah which is not subject to Sales Tax?
2.

Is the act of installation or conversion of materials to real property

by a non-exempt contractor subject to a Use Tax if the contractor did not own the
materials installed or converted?
Secondary Issues:
3.

Can an administrative agency change a longstanding interpretation

of a tax statute, as recognized by Supreme Court opinion, practice and longstanding
regulations, absent any change in law or an indication of change in legislative intent?
4.

If the act of installation or conversion by a contractor of materials

to real property owned by an exempt entity constitutes an independent taxable event
for Use Tax purposes, does the incidence of tax fall upon the purchaser, general
contractor, or upon the subcontractor?
5.

If the act of installation or conversion by a contractor of material

to real property owned by a tax exempt entity constitutes a separate taxable event for
Use Tax purposes, is the amount of Sales Tax measured by the amount paid in
- 1-

connection with such event, or is the Sales Tax to be measured by the amount paid by
the exempt entity to an unrelated third party in a separate event?
6.

Is the Commission's Decision invalid because it is based on

conflicting and inconsistent criteria which are not founded on statutory authority and
which are inconsistently applied?
7.

If the Commission's Decision is ultimately upheld, does equity

require that the change in law be applied prospectively?
The applicable standard of review for each issue is the correction-of-error
standard. Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). This
appeal presents questions of law. Accordingly, the Court should review the
Commission's ruling for correctness but accord the Commission's findings with respect
to law no particular deference. The reviewing court is free to render an independent
interpretation of the questions of law at issue in this case. Ron K. Case Roofing &
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This case depends upon the interpretation of the following statutes and
Tax Commission rules the relevant portions of which are set forth at length in the
Addendum attached hereto:
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103.
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104.
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-42S
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-43S
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this review proceeding, petitioner seeks a redetermination of the Use
Tax assessed against it by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission.
The tax deficiency was assessed against petitioner for building materials that petitioner
incorporated into the construction of the LDS Print Center constructed for the
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
and into two elementary school buildings constructed for the Granite School District.
Petitioner requested redetermination below on the grounds that the
materials in question were purchased directly by the owners, both tax exempt entities,
and that the transactions were therefore exempt from any tax, including Use Tax. The
parties conducted discovery, and the Commission held a formal evidentiary hearing on
the issues on August 27t 28 and 29, 1991. The Commission thereafter entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision upholding the deficiency
assessment expressly as Use Tax. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review
with this court. This brief addresses the Use Tax assessment as it relates to the
building constructed for the Church.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Procedural History.
Arco is an electrical contractor which has been in business since
approximately 1980. (August 28, 1991 Granite School Hearing Transcript, "Gr.Tr.",
Add.Ex. 3, p.32, In.18.) During 1986 Arco entered into contracts or subcontracts to
furnish and/or install electrical equipment in construction projects at four locations on
behalf of three separate entities (the "Owners"). These projects and Owners were: (1)
a print center constructed for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "Church"); (2) a physical facilities building
constructed for the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"); and (3) two elementary school
buildings constructed for the Granite School District ("Granite"). The Church, UTA
and Granite are all tax-exempt entities, the Church being a religious and charitable
organization, and UTA and Granite being political subdivisions of the State of Utah.
These three construction projects were separate and distinct from each
other. (Gen.Doc.R.67, Add.Ex. 1, p.2.) Separate contract documents were entered
into for each project between the Owner and a general contractor or subcontractor.
(Gen.Doc.R. 68,72,78, Add.Ex. 1, pp.3,7,13.) The common threads in these three
projects are (1) Arco installed materials on each project, (2) part of the materials were
originally purchased by the Owner, an exempt entity, without payment of Sales Tax,
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and (3) the Auditing Division assessed a deficiency against Arco with respect to some
or all of the materials bought by (or in the name of) the tax exempt entity.
There are many similarities in what happened with each contract, and in
most applicable principles of law. However, there are also certain material differences
in the fact situations, contract documents and applicable law relating specifically to the
three entities.
In order to avoid confusion with respect to these material differences
(and recognizing that, as a result of indemnity agreements between each exempt entity
and Arco, the Owners were the real parties in economic interest), the Commission
treated this case as actually being three cases. (Gen.Doc.R. 67, Add.Ex. 1, p.2.)
Hearings were held on three separate days, with a different exempt Owner being the
focus of each day. (Gen.Doc.R. 66, Add.Ex. 1, p.l.) The Commission entered three
separate Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, ultimately finding a Use Tax
deficiency with respect to the materials used on the construction projects of the Church
and Granite, but holding no tax due with respect to the materials purchased in the
name of UTA (Gen.Doc.R. 102-103, Add.Ex. 1, p.37-38.)
Thereafter the Church and Granite paid the portions of Arco's deficiency
with respect to their projects, and filed this appeal on behalf of Arco. Neither UTA
nor the Commission have appealed the holding with respect to UTA.
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Recognizing that this case is really two cases, separate briefs are being
filed by the Church and Granite. This brief is on behalf of the Church and relates
specifically to that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made by the
Church, although most of the legal argument applies to Granite also.
B. Facts Relating to Materials for the Church's Project.
In 1986, the Church entered into a contract with Interwest Construction
Company ("Interwest") as general contractor to construct a printing center (the "Print
Center"). (Gen.Doc.R. 78, Add.Ex. 1, p. 13.) Interwest subcontracted with Arco to do
the electrical work, subject to the same general terms and conditions as Interwest.
(Gen.Doc.R. 78, Add.Ex. 1, p. 13.) For convenience, unless otherwise stated, the term
"Contractor" will be used in connection with those contract provisions applying both to
Interwest and Arco.
The contract provided for the Contractor to install four classes of Churchowned materials (the "Church Materials"). These classes of materials were: (1)
materials already owned by the Church and used in the previous printing center; (2) a
multi-million dollar press which was specially ordered for the Prim Center before the
contract was signed; (3) materials which the initial contract indicated were prebid and
already purchased; and (4) additional materials which the Church provided through
change orders issued pursuant to the contract terms during the construction of the
Print Center. All other materials used in the construction of the Print Center were

- 6-

purchased by the Contractor and a sales tax was paid by the Contractor, and all parties
agree that such tax was properly the Contractor's duty.
The Commission noted at the hearing that the first three classes of
materials purchased or in the possession of the Church were tax exempt (August 29,
1991 Church Hearing Transcript "Ch.Tr.", Add.Ex. 4, p.78, ln.8-25), but nevertheless
found the fourth class of materials purchased by the Church to be subject to a Use
Tax which the Commission imposed on Arco. (Gen.Doc.R. 102, Add.Ex. 1, p.37.) The
fourth class of materials upon which the Commission imposed the tax will be referred
to as "Change Order Materials."
All Change Order Materials were acquired pursuant to rights reserved in
the contract. (Gen.Doc.R. 79, Add.Ex. 1, p.14.) Exercising its option to purchase
materials for use in the construction of the Print Center (Gen.Doc.R. 81, Add.Ex. 1,
p. 16), the Church first secured material lists from the Contractors. (Gen.Doc.R. 81,
Add.Ex. 1, p. 16.) Arco then prepared a purchase order which was reviewed by the
Contractors and Church Purchasing. When all was in order, Church Purchasing issued
the purchase order directly to the vendor. (Gen.Doc.R. 81, Add.Ex. 1, p. 16.)
The vendors delivered materials to the job site and billed the Church
directly. (Gen.Doc.R. 81-82, Add.Ex. 1, pp.16-17.) After verification of invoices, the
Church made payment directly to the vendors (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p. 17), a
change order was issued crediting the Church for the cost of the materials (Gen.Doc.R.
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82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17), and the Contractor was relieved of the duty to furnish those
materials. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, pp.40-41, ln.17-1; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.56, ln.3-9.)
This procedure was conducted in accordance with the terms of the
contract, and its implementation substantially modified the relationship of the parties
with respect to the Change Order Materials. Both vendors and Contractors considered
the Church to be the purchaser of the Change Order Materials (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3,
p. 19, In. 12-25), and the parties recognized that it was up to the Church to ultimately
determine what to purchase and from whom to purchase. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, p.38,
In. 1-25; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.20, In. 21-24.) Title to those materials passed directly
from the vendors to the Church. (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17.) Vendors looked
solely to the Church for payment. (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17.) The standard
10% retainage withheld by the Owner was not withheld on the materials. (Gen.Doc.R.
82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17.) Bids by vendors were based on the credit ratings of the exempt
entities rather than the ratings of the Contractors. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, p.28, In. 3-9.)
Warranties on the purchased materials ran to the Church. (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1,
p.17.) Surplus Change Order Materials belonged to and were retained by the Church
(Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, p.46, ln.2-10; Ch. Tr. p. 15, In. 15-25), and when the wrong light
fixtures were ordered and paid for by the Church, the Church was required to provide
the replacement light fixtures. (Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.16 ln.1-19.)
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Similar to the procedures of the Church, the UTA contract initially
required Arco to furnish supplies and materials. (Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31.)
Like the Church, the contract provisions allowed for owner purchased materials.
(Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31.) In contrast to the procedures used by the Church,
UTA did not issue purchase orders until after most of the materials had already been
ordered and delivered (Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31), and at least one of the
suppliers billed Arco directly for the materials. (Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31.)
After the Church-purchased material was delivered to the job site (Ch.Tr.,
Add.Ex. 4, p.25 In. 16-20), the Contractors' duties with respect to receiving and installing
the materials were the same regardless of whether the material was one of the other
three categories of Church Materials or Change Order Materials. (Gen.Doc.R. 78,
Add.Ex. 1, p.13; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.25 ln.21 to p.26 ln.16; p.53 ln.1-21; and p.56 ln.2023.)
This pattern of bidding and modifying the contract was adopted to allow
the Church to avail itself of the Sales and Use Tax exemption long granted for
materials it buys as tangible personal property which are then installed by someone
other than the seller. As of the date the contract was entered into in 1986, this
practice was common among contractors and had been used in connection with a
number of exempt entities over many years. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, pp.18-19, 119-120, 137,
168-9; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.47.)
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However, when the Auditing Division conducted its audits of Utah
contractors with respect to 1986 and 1987, the Division decided to depart from the
historical position of the Commission. (Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.94 ln.10-21.) The result
was more than 30 contractors suddenly being assessed taxes on materials purchased by
exempt entities.
At the hearing before the Commission, the Auditing Division contended
that because Arco installed such materials into the physical structure, Arco could be
considered to have "used or consumed" the materials at issue. The Auditing Division
then argued that such consumption was a taxable use of the materials under the
language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(l).
Conversely, Arco contended that the Church, UTA and Granite were the
purchasers of all the materials at issue and that no Sales and Use Tax was owing
because sales to religious and charitable organizations and political subdivisions are
exempt from Sales and Use Tax by statute.
After the hearing, the Commission concluded that if a tax-exempt entity
purchases an item for conversion to real property by another person or entity, the item
is not exempt from Sales and Use Tax, because the person who converts the item to
real property is the consumer of such item (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 1, p.29), and such
consumption (not the original sale) is itself the taxable event (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex.
1, p.29) expressly subject to the Use Tax. (Gen.Doc.R. 93, Add.Ex. 1, p.28.) The
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Commission further concluded that the overall activities of the tax-exempt entity must
rise to the level of a "real property contractor" before an item purchased by the
tax-exempt entity for conversion to real property would be exempt from Sales or Use
Tax. (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 1, p.29.)
In applying these conclusions to the three separate construction projects
at issue, the Commission ruled that the activities of UTA rose to the level of a "real
property contractor" but that the activities of the Church and Granite did not. That
portion of the Sales Tax assessment against Arco which was attributable to material
purchased by UTA was accordingly abated, while that portion of the assessment
attributable to purchases made by the Church and Granite was upheld as a Use Tax,
(Gen.Doc.R. 102-103, Add.Ex. 1, pp.37-38) and this appeal ensued.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission's decision (the "Decision") represents a sudden departure
from established Sales and Use Tax law in Utah as evidenced directly by the
statements of the trial attorney (admitting the Audit Division was departing from its
historical interpretation of the statute in order to protect the tax base) and indirectly by
the inordinate number of taxpayers (approximately thirty) being challenged. In addition
to ignoring the established Sales and Use Tax law, the Decision is flawed because it
articulates conflicting rules of law, and applies the law inconsistently to the facts.
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Utah has a firmly established rule that a tax based on the use of property
(Le. a Use Tax) can only apply to an out-of-state transfer of title1 which is not
otherwise exempt under the Sales Tax. The tax assessed in the instant case is a Use
Tax on property which was purchased in Utah, but not by the taxpayer against whom
the tax is being assessed, and in transactions expressly exempted by statute. Such a tax
is clearly illegal because it is contrary to the intent of the Legislature and violates this
Court's prior holdings.
The Commission's Decision also violates general principles of statutory
interpretation which hold that longstanding interpretations of laws are impliedly
adopted by the Legislature. Thus, in the absence of legislative enactments, the
Commission does not have authority to abandon its historic position in a way which
prevents utilization of an exemption by the very entities the exemption was intended to
benefit.
The Decision also ignores important elements of the statute in imposing
the tax, is internally inconsistent, and has been applied inconsistently to the facts.
The scope of the Use Tax is limited by a clear Legislative intent to
predicate the tax upon ownership of the property used. The statutory definition of
"use" requires such use be incident to the ownership (or a lease) of the property.
Thus, when a contractor converts materials he has purchased, the contractor can be
1

The statute has subsequently been expanded to also reach leases of property,
but leases are ignored herein since there is no lease involved in this case.
- 12-

considered to be the user of those materials because he is the owner. However, in this
case Arco did not own the Change Order Materials, and therefore the conversion of
those materials on behalf of the owner is not a "use" of the materials by Arco within
the meaning of the statute.
Even if we ignored the statutory definition of "use" and assume arguendo
that Arco could somehow "use" building materials it didn't own and that such nonownership "use" by Arco is taxable, the incidence of the tax would still not fall on Arco.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 imposes the tax upon the "purchaser," (not the "user")
based on the "amount paid" by such "purchaser" for such use. Arco was not the
purchaser (and therefore not the party subject to tax) because it made no purchase
and did not have ownership. Furthermore, any constructive purchase in this case must
be by the general contractor who is primarily responsible for the conversion of the
personal property to realty. In addition, all payments for the alleged "use" of affixing
the Change Order Materials flowed from the Church to Arco. Thus, if non-ownership
"use" is a separate taxable event from the original sale to the Church, as the Commission held, then the Use Tax cannot be based on the sale amount. Instead any Use
Tax assessed against Arco must be based on the "amount paid" by Arco for the "use"
(i.e. conversion of the materials to realty). This amount is zero, resulting in no tax.
The Decision is further flawed by internal inconsistency. In one
paragraph it exempts purchases from the Sales and Use Tax if the exempt entity
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separately hires a contractor on a "labor only" or "install only" contract, and in the very
next paragraph states that if the property is purchased for conversion to real property
by another person or entity the purchase is not exempt. This contradiction is repeated
when the Decision quotes Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S.A.4, which exempts sales to
exempt entities if the seller does not attach the property, and then later purports to
separately tax the act of attaching personalty to realty by "anyone except an exempt
entity." In another contradiction, the Decision first explains that actions not conforming
to the language of the contract will not change the tax consequences because actions
and after-the-fact statements are impossible to audit, and then later the Decision holds
that UTA can ignore its contract and document language and rely on its actions and an
oral explanation.
Given the inconsistencies in the legal analysis, it is not surprising that the
standards announced have been inconsistently applied. On the articulated findings of
fact and stated standards, UTA had fewer features showing bona fide compliance with
the law than the Church. Yet UTA was allowed to "explain" its perceived
shortcomings whereas the Church and Granite were not.
Finally, even if the Commission's change in policy can ultimately be
upheld, it is inequitable to permit the policy change to be applied retroactively.
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ARGUMENT
I.

TAX CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON THE MERE USE OF PROPERTY
ABSENT AN OUT-OF-STATE TRANSFER OF TITLE.
The Commission sums up its underlying theory of the case on page 28 of

its Decision (Gen.Doc.R. 93, App.Ex. 1, p.28) as follows:
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of tangible personal
property, but also upon "tangible personal property stored, used or
consumed in this state." . . . [The] conversion of tangible personal
property into real property is deemed to be the consumption or use of
the tangible personal property, which is the taxable event.
(Emphasis added.)
From the finding that "use" of building materials is a separately taxable
event, the Commission derived all the rest of its conclusions (which assess the tax
based solely on who attaches the materials to real property) stating on page 29 of the
Decision (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 1, p.29):
The
real
real
and
tax.

party that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to
property has used or consumed that property. If that conversion to
property is performed by anyone except an exempt entity, the use
consumption of the converted materials is subject to sales and use
. . .

Therefore, the primary issue in this case is to determine whether the
Petitioner was the real property contractor or whether the [exempt
entities were] the real property contractor.
The Commission then determined that the Church is not the real
property contractor and holds on Page 35 (Gen.Doc.R. 100, Add.Ex. 1, p.35) that Arco
is therefore subject to a "Use Tax." Since the inquiry as to who is the contractor is
- 15-

predicated upon the Commission's belief that attachment of building materials to realty
is itself an independently taxable "use" of the materials resulting in a "Use Tax", this
case should turn on whether the language in the Sales and Use Tax statute that
imposes a tax on the "storage, use or consumption" of property in Utah (i.e. the Use
Tax portion of the statute) was intended by the Legislature to impose a tax when there
is no out-of-state transfer of title or right to the taxed property.
This is not a new question. The Commission has merely given it a new
answer. It was originally asked and answered in the taxpayer's favor during the 1940's
in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408
(1942), Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d
879 (1947) and Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208
(1949). In each case, the Commission found a tax due based on the Use Tax, and in
each case this Court looked to the legislative history and legislative intent to reject the
tax.
As this Court explained in those opinions, Utah's Sales Tax was originally
adopted in 1933 as an excise on the transfer of title to personal property for a
consideration. The Use Tax was adopted in 1937 specifically to protect Utah
merchants who were disadvantaged because the Sales Tax could not constitutionally
reach out-of-state purchases by Utah residents. Then, in 1942, this Court decided the
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first of the three controlling cases, Utah Concrete Products, which both the Commission
and the taxpayers herein claim to govern the case.
The difference of opinion regarding Utah Concrete Products originates
because that case involved three different situations under which personal property was
converted into realty. The Commission appears to have considered only the language
related to the first two situations (which the Court treated as legally identical), where
title to the personal property was transferred to third-party contractors who in turn
were responsible for the conversion of the materials to realty. However, the Court's
conclusion regarding the first two situations does not support the Commission's present
interpretation, and it is, in fact, the third situation, where there was no transfer of title,
which is the controlling precedent.
Citing Utah Concrete Products the Commission asserted in its Decision
"The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that sales and use tax is imposed upon
the party that converts tangible personal property into real property." (Gen.Doc.R. 7980, Add.Ex. 1, pp.14,15.) This statement is untrue. In Utah Concrete Products, this
court affirmatively refused to tax the mere conversion of personalty to realty without a
transfer of title (Le. the third situation), stating:
[W]e hold that building materials used by the manufacturer for its own
use are not subject to tax under the Use Tax Act of 1937.
Id. at 514, 125 P.2d at 409 (Emphasis added).
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The Commission's characterization of Utah Concrete Products also
demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the taxable event involved in the first two
situations. In Utah Concrete Products a tax was assessed for the value of certain
concrete products used to improve real property. However, contrary to the assertion of
the Commission, the tax imposed was a Sales Tax on the transfer of title, and not a
Use Tax on the act of converting the personalty to realty.
In reaching its holding that the Sales Tax applied, this Court indicated the
case turned on whether the original sale by the manufacturer was a "retail sale" to the
final consumer, or a "wholesale sale" of materials for re-sale. It was in this context that
the Commission successfully argued that conversion of personalty to realty constituted
"consumption" or "use" of the materials within the meaning of the Sales Tax. However,
it was the manufacturers (and not the contractors who actually affixed the materials)
who were held liable as retailers for the original sale of the materials.
This Court expressly characterized the question as being whether a Sales
Tax should be imposed in the first two situations and expressly held the tax was, in
fact, imposed as a Sales Tax saying;
[A]re sales of products made by a manufacturer of building materials to
contractors for use upon a private[/public] construction contract taxable
under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (Sales Tax Act) . . . ?
The order complained of is hereby affirmed as to the taxation of plaintiffs
under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, and reversed as to the tax
imposed on plaintiff under the Use Tax Act of 1937.
Id. at 514, 125 P.2d at 409 (Emphasis added).
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Thus, the contractors who actually used the materials were not the parties
made to pay the tax. The tax was clearly imposed upon the transfer of title2 by the
manufacturers. No tax was imposed upon subsequent use of the materials by the
contractors. In the instant case, the Commission expressly found that title to the
materials was transferred to the Church, not Arco (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17),
and based its assessment expressly as a Use Tax (Gen.Doc.R. 102, Add.Ex. 1, p.37) on
the subsequent "use" of the material, not the original sale. Therefore the first two
situations from Utah Concrete Products are inapposite.
Instead it is the third situation which is directly dispositive of this case.
In that situation, Utah Concrete Pipe Company built its own building out of its own
materials. Then, as here, the Commission argued that the mere act of converting
tangible personal property to real property was a "use" of the personalty which was
itself a taxable event.
This Court rejected the Commission's application of the Use Tax to these
facts because there was no transfer of title. The Court first observed that the Use Tax
was levied only on property which was purchased. It then observed that a "purchase"
was defined essentially as a transfer of tangible personal property for a consideration.

2

Transfer of title is the sine qua non of the Sales and Use Tax. In every single
case holding either a manufacturer or a contractor taxable on materials used in the
construction of a building, including those cases cited by the Tax Commission, title to
the materials was transferred to the contractor. Moreover, unless the title was
transferred out-of-state, the court has always applied a sales tax on the transfer of title.
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The Court then expressly held that transfer of title is a mandatory precondition to the
application of the Use Tax stating:
The Legislature contemplated transfer of right, title, or
property from one person to another, and not simple
bookkeeping entries or physical transfer from one place to
another.
Although the language of the statute has been modified slightly by the
Legislature since the Utah Concrete Products decision, the modification has not affected
the conclusion that the Use Tax still requires transfer of title as the result of a
purchase. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 still assesses the tax against the "purchaser"
and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) limits the term "use" in subsection 59-12-103(1) to
exercises of right or power which are "incident to the ownership or the leasing of that
property, item or service." (Emphasis added.) The other two cases cited by the
Commission implicitly reinforce this conclusion. See Olson Constiiiction Company v.
State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961) and Tummurm Trades, Inc.
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), both of which assessed tax
against underlying purchases of materials.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Arco never received title to the
property. Nor did Arco receive any other right, title or interest which in any way
approached ownership. Without transfer of such right, title or interest, the mere
attaching of personal property to real property does not constitute a transfer within the
meaning of the Sales and Use Tax. Therefore, under Utah Concrete Products, Arco is
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not liable for a Use Tax in connection with any building materials purchased by the
Church, including the Change Order Materials.
After Utah Concrete Products, this Court further restricted the Use Tax by
holding that the mandatory transfer of title must occur outside the State of Utah. The
first case to so hold was Union Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commission, 110
Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947), in which this Court rejected a Use Tax on property
purchased in Utah,3 concluding:
The purpose of the tax was to overcome a discrimination
found to exist in the Sales Tax, . . . caused by the inability
to impose the Sales Tax upon transactions in interstate
commerce . . . [and imposition of the tax] acts as a
protection and equalization to the Utah merchant against
out-of-state merchants who may be selling to Utah
purchasers.
. . . As before stated, the obvious purpose of the Use Tax
Act was to impose a tax on the use in this state of property
the sale of which, because the sale took place outside the
state, was beyond the reach of the Utah Sales Tax Act. But
when the Legislature by the specific language of the sales
tax carves out of those sales which it has power to tax
specific sales and exempts them from the sales tax it clearly
evidences a desire to exempt the property so sold from the
2% tax, whether imposed by the Use or Sales Tax Act. To
hold otherwise would practically nullify the obvious
legislative intent.
3

This case is particularly interesting because this Court originally adopted a
position identical to the position of the Commission below based upon the literal
language of the Use Tax (See Utah Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110
Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (Utah 1946) but then reversed itself on this issue because
applying the Use Tax to nullify an express exemption under the Sales tax, as the
Commission attempts to do here, is clearly contrary to legislative intent.
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The requirement for an out-of-state transfer of title in order to follow
legislative intent which is so clearly set out in Union Portland Cement was subsequently
reaffirmed and emphasized in Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170,
209 P.2d 208 (1949). In Geneva Steel the dissent claimed that the interpretation of the
Court so narrowed the scope of the Use Tax Act as to make it useless or a "nullity."
However, the majority properly observed that its decision did not nullify the Use Tax
Act, but merely limited the Use Tax to its proper policing role to prevent property
purchased outside the State of Utah from escaping the Sales Tax. In the Court's
words:
Remaining for the Use Tax to operate upon is the storage,
use or other consumption of property purchased outside of
this state and brought into the state for storage, use or
consumption.
We hold therefore, that the storage, use or other consumption of property, the sale of which is made in this state and
which is not amenable to the Sales Tax, is likewise not
subject to the Use Tax.
Id., at 170, 209 P.2d 208 (Emphasis added).
Union Portland Cement and Geneva Steel plainly hold that where a
transfer of title to materials occurs within this state there cannot be any Use Tax with
respect to those materials. Either the initial sale is subject to the Sales Tax or it is
not. If the sale is exempt from the Sales Tax, the subsequent use is exempt from the
Use Tax.
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In the instant case, all of the Change Order Materials were sold to the
Church within the State of Utah in transactions specifically exempt under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-104(8). It follows from Union Portland Cement and Geneva Steel that the
Legislature did not intend these same materials to thereafter be subject to a tax based
solely on their being "used" in Utah, and therefore the Commission erred in assessing a
Use Tax against Arco.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LONGSTANDING
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.
The Commission's position in this case constitutes a major change in

existing law and practice. There is ample testimony that the procedures followed by
Arco in connection with UTA, Granite and the Church were routinely used by exempt
organizations in connection with construction projects over many years without audit
problems (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, pp.18-19, 119-120, 137, 168-9; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.47),
and UTA even reviewed its methods with the Commission's staff. (August 27, 1991
UTA Hearing Transcript, Add.Ex. 5, pp.8-22.) Indeed, in closing arguments, counsel
for the Auditing Division not only admitted that the position being articulated
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constituted a substantial change in interpretation,4 but explained that the change was
driven by a perceived need to protect revenues. (Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.91, In. 20
through p.92 In. 22.)
Such unilateral changes are not in accordance with law. Utah Concrete
Products held that longstanding compliance with administrative rulings lends strength to
the presumption of a regulation's validity. The same policy considerations dictate that
longstanding practices should also be recognized as evidencing a valid interpretation of
a statute, particularly when those practices are in conformity with ihe plain language of
the statute and the decisions of this Court. See Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 762
P.2d 1119 (Utah App. 1988) citing Travelers Indent. Co. v. Barnes, 191 Colo. 278, 552
P.2d 300, 303 (1976) ("Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a
statute and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of
administrative authority granted."); also citing IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296,

4

This was not a mere change in the level of enforcement of an established
interpretation. Instead it constitutes a new interpretation of a statute which previously
had a well-settled meaning. In the words of opposing counsel:
Now there has been some talk . . . that some of these
positions are not consistent with the position that has
historically been taken. That's absolutely correct. They're
not intended to be consistent with positions that have been
historically taken.
. . . We don't feel that the commission should be bound
by the auditing's past practices in formulating a policy."
(Ch.Tr. p.94 ln.10-21.)
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297 (Utah 1975) (quoting New Mexico ex rel McCulloch v. Ashby, 73 N.M. 267, 387
P.2d 588 (1963) ("Agency regulations may not abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the
statute creating the right or imposing the duty.").
In the instant case, the practice of the Auditing Division not to assess
deficiencies in connection with purchases following procedures similar to those used by
the Church was many years old at the time of the change, and therefore the prior
practice should receive a presumption of correctness.
In any event, it is not within the purview of the Commission to expand
the reach of a tax law, whatever its reasons. On this issue, Utah Concrete Products
instructs with respect to the Use Tax:
[T]he interpretation placed on the language of the statute by
the Tax Commission must not do violence to its apparent
meaning. The construction placed here by the defendant
Tax Commission in the Act misinterprets the meaning and
intent of the Legislature. It cannot be termed a "practical"
construction. Governmental agencies cannot deprive the
courts of their judicial functions nor can the agencies extend
the operation of the statute by administrative regulations.
Id. at 412, 125 P.2d 408 (1942).
If the Commission lacks power to extend the reach of a statute for a
legitimate reason, by reason of regulations, the Commission must lack such power when
an extension is adopted without regulations, especially if the purpose is to protect
revenue, and not to implement change in the statute or Legislative intent.
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This is particularly true when, as here, the change has the direct negative
effect of eviscerating public policy by effectively denying to exempt organizations the
value of the exemptions in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2) and (8), which were
enacted by the Legislature expressly for their benefit. Indeed, frustration of Legislative
intent was the express reason for this Court's refusal to apply a Use Tax in Union
Portland Cement, Supra. See also Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 725 P.2d
1357, 1359 (Utah 1986) ("Although exemptions from taxation are generally construed
narrowly, . . . they should, nonetheless, be construed with sufficient latitude to
accomplish the intended purpose.")
III.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IGNORES CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF
THE STATUTE
A corolary of the Use Tax being enacted to extend the reach of the Sales

Tax to out-of-state transactions is the concept that the Use Tax is to be applied to the
new owner of the property. The Sales Tax is an excise on the transfer of ownership,
and by policy is applied to the acquiring party (although it is frequently collected from
the transfering party). Thus the Sales Tax is always applied to the owner of the
property transferred. For the Use Tax to be an effective substitute for the Sales Tax,
as the Legislature intended, the Use Tax must be applied to the same party, who,
again, will always the new owner of the property.
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Since the Use Tax is intended to fall upon the new owner, it is clear that
any Use Tax falling on a non-owner is being applied to the wrong person. Thus an
ownership requirement is incorporated in 30
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) which limits the statutory meaning of the word "use"
to include only those uses which are "incident to ownership or the leasing" of property.
Therefore, although the mere conversion of personalty to realty may argueably be a
"use" in an abstract sense, such conversion is not a "use" in the statutory sense.
In the instant case, Arco was not the owner of the Change Order
Materials. It follows that, although attachment of the Change Order Materials to the
Print Center may have been a statutory "use" by the Church which owned the
materials, such attachment definitely does not constitute a statutory "use" of these
materials by Arco.
A second statutory reason Arco can not be subject to a Use Tax on the
installation or conversion of non-owned building materials to realty is that Arco is not a
"purchaser." It is clear that the mere attachment of personal property to realty does
not constitute a retail sale, and therefore the Sales Tax is inapplicable. Thus, the tax
can only be based on Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(l), which provides in relevant
part:
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or
charged for the following . . .
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(1) tangible personal property stored, used or consumed in the
state.
(Emphasis added).
To apply Section 59-12-103(l)(l) to this case, the first issue is to
determine who is "the purchaser." Utah Concrete Products held that a purchase
requires a transfer of right, title or property. In this context, the Church is clearly the
purchaser since it ordered, paid for and received title to the Change Order Materials.
Since the Church was the purchaser, the statute places the tax on the Church and not
Arco. Alternatively, if it is assumed arguendo that a transfer from the Church to Arco
could be constructively deemed to take place when the materials are delivered5 for use
in construction, there is still no tax due since a purchase by Arco would constitute a
sale by the Church, and sales by a church are also exempt under Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-104(8).
Additionally, even if we were to go so far as to ignore all normal aspects
of the word "purchaser," as the Commission appears to do, and arbitrarily hold that a
contractor can be considered the "purchaser" per se, it is still not clear that Arco is the
appropriate contractor.
The Commission's opinion repeatedly states that "the contractor" is liable
for the Sales and Use Tax attributable to attaching the personalty to the real estate.

5

Utah Concrete Products held that merely delivering materials to a construction
site is not the kind of transfer contemplated by the statute.
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In the context of the Church and the Commission's opinion, it appears that "the
contractor" refers to the general contractor, and not each of the subcontractors. This is
because the Church only had one contract, which placed primary responsibility for
affixing the Change Order Materials on Interwest. All subcontractors, including Arco,
act under the general contractor's direction in order to complete the original contract.
If each subcontractor were the "purchaser," there would be multiple liability for the
same materials, since the general contractor and his subs can each be liable for affixing
the same materials under separate contracts. In addition, the liability issue would
become more confused if allocations are made for materials or equipment attached as
a cooperative effort between two or more contractors.
It is clearly improper to assess more than one tax, and allocations of tax
would be arbitrary at best. The only practical solution would be to assess all taxes
against the general contractor, which it is reasonable to assume is what the Commission
meant to do. Moreover, if the assessment is not against the general contractor,
subcontractors would remain liable for taxes on property they affix even when the
exempt entity is the general contractor, contrary to the Decision.
In the instant case, Interwest Construction was the general contractor with
respect to the Print Center, not Arco. Thus, since the contract ran from the Church to
Interwest, and not from the Church to Arco, determining that the general contractor is
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liable for the Use Tax means that the deficiency should be placed against Interwest
and not against Arco.
Application of the statute to Arco also presents a difficulty in determining
the amount of the tax. The Commission blithely assumes that the tax should be based
on the amount the Church paid for the materials. However, if Arco is constructively
deemed the purchaser as a result of affixing the Change Order Materials, there is no
basis to use the Church's payments as the measure of the tax. The tax is not levied on
the value of the materials, it is levied on the amount paid by the purchaser to use or
consume the materials. In the instant case, Arco received money to "use" the
materials, it didn't pay money for the privilege of using the materials. Since no amount
was paid by Arco to "use" the materials, there is no taxable base against which to
assess the tax.
IV.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND
UNEVENLY APPLIED TO THE EXEMPT ENTITIES.
The Commission's opinion is so self-contradictory it is impossible to

determine what the actual standards are. The Commission sets down an absolute rule
holding that the attachment of personalty to realty is a taxable event. This rule is
reiterated in Paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the Conclusions of Law and on pages 28 and
29 of the Decision. (Gen.Doc.R. 85-88, 93-94, Add.Ex. 1, pp.20-23, 28-29.)
The rule makes no allowance for who actually purchases or owns the
personal property in the ordinary sense. On its face it operates without regard as to:
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(1) whether there is any passage of title; (2) whether the passage of title occurred in
Utah; or (3) whether an exemption exists under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104. The
only operative factor is who attaches the personalty to the realty.
On the other hand, these absolute statements are directly or impliedly
contradicted by statute, the Commissions's Rules and Supreme Court pronouncement;
by other statements in the Decision, and more importantly by the actions of the
Commission itself in its ultimate determination of which materials would actually be
taxed. All of these factors contradict the Commission's rule by establishing that exempt
entities can purchase property to be installed by a third party contractor without
incurring a tax.
The statute, rules and Supreme Court cases directly or impliedly
challenging the Commission's rule include: Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(8) (which
contains no limitations based upon whether the church subsequently converts the
tangible personal property to realty); Utah Admin. R. 865-19-43S (which states "AH
sales made to or by religious and charitable institutions in the conduct of their regular
religious and charitable functions are not subject to Sales Tax") (Emphasis added);
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S.A.4 (which says sales to exempt entities are not taxable
unless the seller installs the materials); and Ford J. Twaits Company v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944) where this Court noted "it would have
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been a simple matter"6 to avoid tax on material used in a government contract.
Contradictory statements in the Decision include Paragraph 13.b. (which allows installonly contracts) on page 22 (Gen.Doc.R. 87, Add.Ex. 1, p.22) and the quotation of Utah
Admin. R. 865-19-58S.A.4. referred to above.
The most revealing contradictions, however, are in the Commission's own
actions. In discussing the UTA contract on pages 31 and 32 of the Decision
(Gen.Doc.R. 96-97, Add.Ex. 1, p.31-32), the Commission relied heavily on the fact that
the UTA contract was, in practice, for labor only. Similarly, and illustrating a more
clear inconsistency, the Commission allowed Interwest (with the assistance of Arco and
other subcontractors) to install the three classes of Church Material described in
Paragraph 8 of Page 13 of the Facts (Gen.Doc.R. 73, Add.Ex. 1, p.8) without tax,
despite the fact that (1) the existence of these additional materials was drawn
specifically to the attention of the Commission, (2) the Church conceded it was not its
own general contractor and (3) the duties of the contractors with respect to the Church
Materials on which no tax was imposed was identical to the duties of the contractors
with respect to the Change Order Materials on which a tax was imposed.

6

In the words of the Court: " . . . it is apparent that the government did not
intend in the instant case to exempt plaintiff from any local taxes. Had it so intended,
it would have been a simple matter to authorize plaintiff to buy as an agent of the
government, to issue a tax exemption certificate referred to in article 31 of the
contract, or otherwise declare the goods government property."
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The Commission was also inconsistent regarding the criteria by which the
parties were allowed to attempt to prove their compliance with the legal standards.
On page 30 of the Decision (Gen.Doc.R. 95, Add.Ex. 1, p.30), the Commission states
that generally the actions and oral statements of the Petitioner will not be followed
when they conflict with the written statements of the contract and related documents.
Then, on page 31 (Gen.Doc.R. 96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31), the Commission allows UTA to
rely on its unwritten actions and oral explanations to overcome three areas of "concern"
regarding evidence that UTA did not have an install-only contract. As a result, UTA
was excused from language calling for Arco to furnish and install materials and not
issuing purchase orders until after the materials had been received.
The Commission's rules on evidence were applied differently to the
Church. Not only is there no indication in the opinion that the Commission considered
any of the Church's explanations for either the intent or effect of its contract
provisions, the Commission even refused to give effect to the written change orders
which relieved Arco of the obligation to furnish materials although such change orders
were executed.
Given these inconsistencies, it is impossible for taxpayers to know or
understand their duties with respect to the Sales and Use Tax. Administrative necessity
dictates that the Decision can not be allowed to stand in its present form.
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V.

THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION IF UPHELD, SHOULD BE
APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY ONLY.
As set forth above, the Decision was contrary to, and a reversal of a

longstanding interpretation of the statute. In those instances in which a longstanding
interpretation has been overturned, this Court has recognized the unfairness of applying
the new rule retroactively or to pending cases. Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County
Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982) and Utah County, etc. v. Intermountain Health Care,
709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). Therefore, if this Court upholds the Commission's Decision,
the new interpretation should only be applied prospectively, and not to the 1986
transactions made in reliance on the former construction of the slatute.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's Decision is contrary to the intent of the Legislature as
manifested in the Sales and Use Tax statutes for the last 50 years and directly contrary
to the holdings of this Court. In addition, the Decision is self-contradictory and
impossible to implement with any meaningful certainty.
This Court should therefore follow its prior decisions and uphold the
intent of the Legislature by reiterating that the Use Tax is applicable only to out-ofstate purchases brought into Utah for use or consumption. Then, applying that clear
rule to the facts of this case, the judgment of the Commission assessing a Use Tax
should be reversed.
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On the other hand, even if this Court decides to allow a Use Tax, the
Court should still dismiss the assessments against Arco because, under the Use Tax
statute, Arco is not the proper "purchaser" and Arco did not gay anything for its right
to convert the Change Order Materials.
Finally, if this Court elects to reconsider its prior holdings, and interprets
the statute so as to not require an actual purchase, ownership or an amount paid, it
should recognize that this is a substantial change in interpretation, articulate a
comprehensible standard which can be uniformly administered and then apply the new
interpretation prospectively only.
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